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The  dramatic  increase  in  securitisation  activity  has  modified  the  functioning  of  credit 
markets by reducing the fundamental role of liquidity transformation performed by financial 
intermediaries.  We  claim  that  the  changing  role  of  banks  from  “originate  and  hold”  to 
“originate, repackage and sell” has also modified banks’ abilities to grant credit and the 
effectiveness  of  the  bank  lending  channel  of  monetary  policy.  Using  a  large  sample  of 
European banks, we find that the use of securitisation appears to shelter banks’ loan supply 
from the effects of monetary policy. Securitisation activity has also strengthened the capacity 
of banks to supply new loans but this capacity depends upon business cycle conditions and, 
notably, upon banks’ risk positions. In this respect the recent experience of the sub-prime 
mortgage loans crisis is very instructive. 
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1 
European banks rarely used securitisation techniques before the introduction of the 
euro. In the last decade, however, there has been a spectacular increase in securitisation 
activity in the euro area. This is partly a global trend but the escalation in securitisation 
activity is also linked to other factors such as the closer integration in European financial 
markets as well as a move towards a more market-based financial system. This development 
has  probably  changed  the  monitoring  function  performed  by  banks  (Diamond,  1984; 
Holmström  and  Tirole,  1997).  Securitisation  has  also  reduced  the  fundamental  role 
traditionally performed by banks in liquidity transformation (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). In 
other words, nowadays even if a project is illiquid, the underlying loan may, in principle, be 
sold on to the market providing originating banks with additional sources of financing. In 
this way, while the origination of bank loans remains to a large extent local, securitisation 
can make previously illiquid loans tradable and available to global investors. As a result, 
banks maintain a central role as originators and evaluators of credit risk, while progressively 
losing importance as primary holders of illiquid assets. 
Loan securitization activity together with the emergence of credit derivative markets 
seems to have altered credit risk management by banks. Through these financial innovations, 
credit risk may be easily transferred away from banks’ balance sheets to other economic 
agents. Protection sellers, in turn, may further combine and diversify their asset portfolio, 
reaching  parts  of  the  credit  spectrum  that,  until  recently,  were  mostly  illiquid.  All  these 
developments are likely to have contributed to a change in the way banks grant loans and 
react to monetary policy shocks. 
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4 
We  add  to  the  “bank  lending  channel”  literature  by  considering  the  effects  of 
securitisation  on  loan  supply.  To  date,  the  “identification  problem”  of  the  transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy has been solved by claiming that only certain bank-specific 
characteristics (such as size, liquidity and capitalization) influence loan supply movements, 
while the demand for bank loans from borrowers is largely independent of them. After a 
tightening of monetary policy, the drop in the supply of bank loans is expected to be larger 
for:  (1)  small  banks,  which  are  financed  almost  exclusively  from  deposits  and  equity 
(Kashyap and Stein, 1995); (2) less liquid banks, which cannot protect their loan portfolio 
against  monetary  tightening  simply  by  drawing  down  cash  and  securities  (Stein,  1998; 
Kashyap and Stein, 2000) and (3) poorly capitalised banks, which might be below their target 
capital and have less access to markets for uninsured funding (Peek and Rosengren, 1995; 
Kishan and Opiela, 2000; Van den Heuvel, 2002).
2 
This paper argues that the development of securitisation has changed the bank lending 
channel  mechanism.  Securitisation  has  also  probably  altered  those  bank  characteristics 
usually emphasised in the literature to identify shifts in loan supply. The size indicator is less 
significant because securitisation activity can considerably reduce the amount of loans on 
banks’ balance sheets (DeYoung and Rice, 2004). Liquidity is also affected by securitisation 
because of the short-term inflows caused by the sale of asset-backed securities that modify 
the  standard  liquidity  ratio.  Securitization  activity  may  also  reduce  the  regulatory 
requirements for capital and make the standard capital-to-asset ratio a poor approximation of 
the relevant capital constraints faced by banks in this regard. More broadly, securitisation 
provides banks with additional flexibility to face changes in market conditions associated 
with monetary policy movements. 
An  extensive  database  of  asset-backed  securities  is  used  to  analyse  the  impact  of 
securitisation on loan supply, focusing not only on the securitisation of mortgage markets, 
but also on other forms of bank loans. We employ therefore a comprehensive dataset of 
asset-backed securities issued since 1999, when the market started in the euro area, matching 
                                                            
2 All these studies on cross-sectional differences in the effectiveness of the “bank lending channel” refer to the 
US. The literature on European countries is far from conclusive (see, amongst others, Ehrmann et al., 2003 and 




them with individual bank’s balance-sheet information. The estimation is performed using an 
approach similar to that used within the Monetary Transmission Network, a joint project 
conducted by a group of economists affiliated with the ECB and the National Central Banks 
of the Eurosystem (Angeloni, Mojon and Kashyap, 2003). 
The  main  finding  of  the  paper  is  that  asset  securitisation  significantly  reduces  the 
importance of the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission. This effect seems 
to depend upon two main mechanisms: first, asset securitisation increases banks’ liquidity 
and reduces banks’ funding needs in the event of monetary tightening; second, it allows 
banks to transfer a part of their credit risk to the markets (including institutional investors 
such  as  hedge  funds,  insurance  companies  and  pension  funds)  and  thereby  reduce  their 
regulatory  requirements  on  capital.  This  capital  relief  seems  to  cause,  ceteris  paribus,  a 
further increase in supplied lending.  
Securitisation activity has also strengthened the capacity of banks to supply new loans 
to households and firms for a given amount of funding. However, we show that this capacity 
changes  over  time  due  to  business  cycle  conditions:  it  is  maximised  during  economic 
expansion when there is probably little uncertainty (in the terms of Frank Knight) among 
investors about the valuation of structured products. 
The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  2  outlines  recent 
developments in securitisation activity in the euro area, compared with experiences in the 
United  States.  These  institutional  developments  provide  the  basis  for  the  subsequent 
econometric analysis in Section 3, which considers how securitisation activity may affect the 
monetary transmission mechanism. Section 4 describes the econometric model and the data, 
while Section 5 presents evidence on the response of bank lending to a monetary shock. 
Section  6  describes  some  robustness  checks  performed  on  the  results.  The  final  section 
summarises the main conclusions. 
2. Developments in securitisation in the euro area 
Securitisation can be defined, in a broad way, as the process whereby individual bank 
loans and other financial assets are bundled together into tradable securities that are sold to 
the secondary market. In the United States the market for asset-backed securities started to  
 
6 
develop by means of government-sponsored agencies (such as the Federal National Mortgage 
Association, known as Fannie Mae, and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation or 
Freddie Mac)
3 that enhanced mortgage loan liquidity by issuing and guaranteeing, but not 
originating, asset-backed securities. These agencies contributed to the progressive growth in 
the outstanding volume of US agency mortgage-backed securities to USD 4 trillion at the end 
of 2006. Including both agency and non-agency issues, the US market for mortgage-related 
securities nowadays accounts for over USD 6.5 trillion, representing the largest segment of 
the fixed income market in the world (to give an idea of the magnitude, the US corporate 
bond market accounts for USD 5.4 trillion, while the Treasury segment accounts for USD 4.3 
trillion). 
In contrast to the US experience, the development of the asset securitisation market in 
the euro area started much later - at the end of the 1990s - and was not triggered by the 
introduction of any specific government agencies.
4 As shown in Figure 1, the growth in euro-
denominated securitisation started at the end of the 1990s and accelerated strongly from 2004 
onwards. The annual net flow of asset-backed securities issuance in 2006 was around one 
fifth of total bank loans granted to households and non-financial corporations in the euro 
area.  
The reasons for the spectacular growth in securitisation activity in the euro area since 
1999 are linked to three main factors: the increased demand from investors; technological 
and financial innovation; and the introduction of euro. First, the demand for asset-backed 
securities has grown rapidly from institutional investors, who are more willing and able to 
invest in credit risk. Asset-backed securities cater for the increasing number of sophisticated 
institutional investors seeking to buy assets that typically have a good rating and provide an 
extra  yield  over  government  bonds  (Rajan,  2006).  Moreover,  these  securities  can  be 
constructed to offer specific, sometimes even tailor-made, risk-return trade-offs that can be 
                                                            
3 Created in 1938 and 1968, respectively. 
4 Unlike in the United States and United Kingdom, where a common law system is in place, most continental 
European countries possess a continental law framework under which a specific regulation is required to issue 
asset-backed securities. In this respect, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain had to 
enact specific laws to remove obstacles to the development of securitisation.  
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segmented by rating, asset class, sector and country of origination thereby tapping into a 
broader investor base. 
Second,  technological  advancements  have  been  instrumental in the development of 
securitisation via dramatic improvements in the storage, processing and pricing of financial 
data. Technological progress has therefore changed the cost structure of issuing asset-backed 
securities and increased the spectrum of financial products.  
Third, in addition to these global trends, the introduction of the euro has given a strong 
impulse to the corporate bond and securitisation markets (ECB, 2007). The disappearance of  
exchange rate risk among euro-area countries, the increase in financial integration (Baele et 
al., 2004) and a more market-based financial system have all contributed to enhancing the 
liquidity and size of the securitisation market. As a result, institutional investors increased 
their  cross-country  exposure  while  issuers  gained  access  to  a  broader  pool  of  potential 
investors.  At  the  same  time,  increased  bank  competition  also  helped  by  lowering 
underwriters’ and managers’ fees.  
The  increase  in  the  use  of  securitisation  techniques  in  the  euro  area  has  been 
widespread  but  remains  heterogeneous  across  countries  (see  Figure 2). In relative terms, 
asset  securitisation  has  been  strongest  in  countries  which  have  undergone  significant 
increases in real estate prices since the introduction of the euro such as Italy, Spain, Portugal 
and the Netherlands (Figure 3). In this respect, it is worth noting that residential as well as 
commercial mortgage-backed securities (RMBS and CMBS) accounted for 68% of all euro-
denominated securities issued (Figure 4). This is mainly because of the strong degree of 
commoditisation of this type of loan, as well as the high standardisation of credit assessment 
techniques  that  makes  the  pooling  and  selling  of a  large  number  of mortgages easier to 
originate  for  borrowers  and  easier  to  assess  for  investors.  Balance  sheet  cash-flow 
collateralised  debt  obligations  (CDOs)  accounted  for  around  18%  while  consumer  and 
corporate asset-backed securities (ABS) represented around 14% of total issuance. In terms 
of originators, the securitisation market is overwhelmingly dominated by commercial banks, 
while  the  share  of  securitisation  products  issued  directly  by  non-financial  corporations 
remains relatively very small (ECB, 2007).  
 
8 
The location of the credit investors may be very far away from the residence of the 
household or the corporate borrower. In this respect, based on a survey conducted by the 
Bond Market Association, for the period 2005-2006, less than 50% of the risk connected to 
European ABS structured products was bought by euro-area investors (see Figure 5). More 
than  one  third  was  bought  by  UK  investors,  while  the  remainder  was  disseminated 
elsewhere, including Asia, the Middle East and Africa. Similar results are obtained when 
examining  the  investor  location  of  CDOs.  Given  this  increase  in  the  distance  between 
borrowers and credit investors, the role of the market in pricing such assets, together with 
that  of  rating  agencies,  becomes  pivotal  as  a  signal  of  credit  risk  and  as  a  disciplining 
mechanism. 
In this paper, we focus on the traditional concept of securitisation which involves both 
full funding via the true sale of bank loans as well as credit risk transfer (these instruments 
account for 84% of total securitisation activity in Europe). Special care is taken to account 
for individual banks’ characteristics, including market-derived measures of banks’ risk.
5 The 
latter control is very important also in light of the more recent tensions in credit risk markets 
that started in the summer of 2007. The turmoil underlined the role of financial innovation in 
connection with bank risk-taking and the necessity of a more careful analysis from investors 
of certain forms of asset-backed securities. 
3.  How does securitisation affect the monetary transmission mechanism? 
The changing role of banks from “originate and hold” to “originate, repackage and 
sell” is likely to have influenced the effectiveness of the bank lending channel of monetary 
policy. We claim that the standard set up of the bank lending channel to capture the effect of 
banks’ conditions on loan supply changes if banks can grant mortgages and other loans, and 
are able to pass them on to markets. 
                                                            
5 By looking at the true sales of bank loans, we analyse the funding element of securitisation rather than its 
overall  credit  risk  transfer  effect,  which  could  also  be  obtained  through  other  instruments  such  as  credit 
derivatives or the syndicated loan market. It is worth noting that we analyse the value of securitised assets that 
are removed from the bank’s balance sheet so that the performance of these securities no longer depends on the 




In their seminal work, Bernanke and Blinder (1988) show that if some borrowers have 
limited access to the capital market and depend mostly on bank loans for external funding, 
bonds and loans are imperfect substitutes and changes in the composition of bank assets also 
influence investment financing. In response to monetary tightening, the credit channel works 
if the reduction in supplied loans is not counterbalanced by greater access by firms to the 
capital markets. 
The literature on the bank lending channel claims that banks’ conditions also affect 
how banks’ supply of credit responds to monetary policy changes. After monetary tightening, 
the response of supplied lending will be less severe for big, liquid and well-capitalised banks 
(Kashyap and Stein, 1995, 2000; Kishan and Opiela, 2000; Peek and Rosengren, 1995; Stein, 
1998; Van den Heuvel, 2002; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004). For example, big and well-
capitalised banks have more access to markets for uninsured funding, while liquid banks may 
simply draw down cash and securities to attenuate for the effects of a drop in deposits. 
Securitisation provides an alternative way for banks to maintain the credit relationship 
with the client by simply bundling together some loans into tradable securities and selling 
them on to the secondary market. This has major consequences for the standard transmission 
mechanism.  First,  banks  may  obtain  additional  liquidity  independently  of  their  securities 
holdings and the standard liquidity indicator may be less informative than in the past. This 
mechanism reduces the effectiveness of the bank lending channel in a way similar to the 
critique advanced by Romer and Romer (1990). According to these authors, if banks had the 
possibility  to  raise,  without  limit,  CDs  or  bonds,  which  are  not  subject  to  reserve 
requirements,  the  bank  lending  channel  would  be  ineffective.  In  this  respect,  through 
securitisation, loans can be readily removed from banks’ balance sheets and changed in cash; 
findings for the US jumbo mortgages market suggest that securitisation could make the bank 
lending channel less effective (Loutskina and Strahan, 2006).
6 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
“bankruptcy remote” from the originator. This contrasts with the case of corporate bonds where the bond is 
essentially backed by a promise to pay by the issuer. 
6 Existing evidence on the effects of securitisation on interest rates remains scarce and conclusions are mixed. 
Kolari, Fraser and Anari (1998) show that securitisation activity increases liquidity in the mortgage market and 
insulates mortgage interest rates from the effects produced by the monetary policy operations of the central 




Second,  by  removing  loans  from  their  balance-sheet,  banks  can  obtain  regulatory 
capital relief on account of the transfer of credit risk, which allows for a positive net effect 
on the loan supply. This mechanism is expected to continue with the implementation of the 
Basel II Accord – provided that banks also remove the underlying risk from their balance 
sheet – which has a stronger focus on credit risk management and economic capital.
7 At the 
same time, the final effect on credit risk is very difficult to predict because banks may be 
induced to shift to riskier assets (Donahoo and Shaffer, 1991; Dionne and Harchaoui, 2003).
8   
Details of the effects of securitisation on bank lending behaviour can also be found in 
the existing literature. Loan sales provide a lower cost method of financing for banks facing a 
competitive deposit market (Pennacchi, 1988). This effect has probably become stronger in 
recent  years.  James  (1988)  examines  the  incentives  for  banks  to  engage  in  “off-balance 
sheet” activities, such as commercial loan sales and points out that these can mitigate the 
“under-investment” problem for banks which previously issued risky debt. In other words, 
loan sales permit banks to invest in more projects with positive net present value than would 
have been the case in the past. 
More  recently,  some  papers  have  focused  on  how  securitisation  activity  evolves 
through the business cycle, although the evidence produced to date is far from conclusive. 
On the one hand, Stanton (1998) finds that securitisation increases in periods of cyclical 
downturns or individual firm weakness. On the other hand, Estrella (2002) points out that 
securitisation of multi-family home mortgages, as a proportion of outstanding mortgages, 
tends to decline during recessions. The link between securitization and the business cycle is 
also very important as regards the implications for monetary policy. Kuttner (2000) examines 
this issue by comparing the relative growth of ABS and bank loans over the business cycle. If 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
rate  is  stronger  with  an  increasing  recourse  to  securitization.  He  concludes  that  the  change  in  efficacy  of 
monetary policy appears to derive from non-interest effects, such as the liquidity and credit volumes. In line 
with this finding, Fernald, Keane and Mosser (1994), examine the influence of securitisation on the monetary 
policy  transmission  mechanism  using  mortgage-backed  securities  as  an  example  and  conclude  that  the  IT 
revolution is raising the effectiveness of interest rate channels. 
7 While asset-backed securities are expected to remain the dominant instrument being securitised, higher growth 
is expected on less granular securities such as small and medium enterprise CDOs and other corporate-backed 
deals owing to the greater scope for capital release (Hancock et al., 2005 and J. P. Morgan, 2006). 





banks use securitisation to shield their supply of loans from the effects of monetary policy, 
the volume of ABS should move in opposite direction in response to monetary policy. 
Overall, the increasing importance of loan securitisation together with the emergence 
of the credit derivative market, have improved credit risk management by banks. Through 
these innovations, credit risk can be commoditised and transferred away from banks’ balance 
sheets to other economic agents who might, in turn, acquire credit risk to diversify their 
overall risk position or to generate revenues. This probably also has some consequences for 
the bank lending channel. 
In recent years, better credit risk management by banks may have partly contributed to 
the observed gradual easing of credit standards applied to loans and credit lines observed, as 
reported in the ECB’s Bank Lending Survey (Figure 6). This diminishing pressure on banks’ 
balance sheets is also reflected in the increase in the distance to default of banks in recent 
years (Figure 7). All these developments may have contributed, other things being equal, to a 
relaxation  of  constraints  on  banks’  loan  supply.  This  issue  will  be  addressed  in  the 
econometric part of the paper by explicitly taking into account the link between banks’ risk 
and lending supply.
9 
4. The econometric model and the data 
The empirical specification, based on Kashyap and Stein (1995), Ehrmann et al. (2003) 
and Ashcraft (2006), is designed to test whether banks that securitise loans react differently 
to monetary policy shocks. This approach is in line with the research conducted within the 
Monetary Transmission Network (Angeloni, Mojon and Kashyap, 2003).  
                                                            
9 A complete analysis of the impact of the use of credit derivatives on loan supply goes beyond the scope of this 
study. In general, new risk management techniques in the presence of friction should, ceteris paribus, increase 
the supply of bank credit. Existing empirical studies and practitioners assessments drawn from fact-finding 
exercises support this idea (ECB, 2007). In this respect, Hirtle (2007), using data on individual loans made by a 
sample of banks between 1997 and 2005, finds evidence suggesting that greater use of credit derivatives is 
associated with the greater supply of bank credit for large loans (i.e. to large corporate borrowers), although not 
for (previously negotiated) commitment lending. On-balance-sheet amounts of commercial and industrial loans 
also appear to increase as the protection afforded by credit derivatives rises. Goderis et al. (2006) find that 
banks adopting advanced credit risk management techniques experience a permanent increase in their target 
loan levels of around 50%.  
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The model is given in the following equation:
10 
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with i=1,…, N , k= 1, …,12 and  t=1, …, T where N is the number of banks, k is the country 
and T is the final year. 
In  equation  (1)  the  growth  rate  in  bank  lending  to  residents  (excluding  interbank 
positions), Dln(Loans), is regressed on nominal GDP growth rates, Dln(GDPN), to control 
for country-specific loan demand shifts. The introduction of this variable captures cyclical 
macroeconomic movements and serves to isolate the monetary policy component of interest 
rate changes (DiM). The econometric specification also includes four interactions between 
changes in the interest rate controlled by the monetary policy authority and bank-specific 
characteristics: SEC, the securitisation activity indicator, SIZE, the log of total assets, LIQ, 
securities  and  other  liquid  assets  over  total  assets,  CAP, the capital-to-asset ratio. Bank-
specific characteristics refer to t-1 in order to avoid an endogeneity bias.  










SEC , where SL 
stands for the flow of securitised lending in year t and TAt-1 represents total assets at the end 
of the previous year. Following Ehrmann et al. (2003), all bank-specific characteristics have 
been normalised with respect to their average across all banks in the respective sample, in 
order to get indicators that amount to zero over all observations. This means that for model 
(1) the average of the interaction terms are also zero, and the parameters  j b  may be broadly 
interpreted as the average monetary policy effect on lending for a theoretical average bank. 
                                                            
10  The  model  in  levels  implicitly  allows  for  fixed  effects  and  these  are  discarded  in  the  first  difference 




The sample used relates to the period from 1999 to 2005,
11 covering the growth in 
securitisation activity in the euro area and the single monetary policy whereby all banks are 
subject to one monetary regime. The interest rate taken as the monetary policy indicator is 
the three-month Euribor. 
Securitisation may dramatically affect bank loans dynamics. Standard statistics do not 
take into account that even if a loan has been securitized (and it is therefore expelled from 
banks’ balance sheets) it still continues to finance the economy.
12 We have tried to tackle this 
statistical issue by simply re-adding the flows of securitised loans (SL) to the change in the 
stock  of  loans  to  calculate  a  corrected  measure  of  the  growth  rate  for  lending  that  is 
independent of the volume of asset securitisation (DlnLt=ln(Lt+SLt)- lnLt-1). 
To give a rough idea of the bias that can be caused by asset securitisation activity to the 
computation of the lending growth rate, in Figure 8 the gross annual growth rate of lending 
in the euro area (solid line) is compared with that corrected for securitised loans outflows 
(dotted line). The bias tends to increase over time and reach a value of around 2 percentage 
points in 2005. 
We use annual data obtained from Bankscope, a commercial database maintained by 
International Bank Credit Analysis Ltd. (IBCA) and the Brussels-based Bureau van Dijk. In 
particular,  we consider balance sheet and income statement data for a sample of around 
3,000 euro-area banks. Table 1 gives some basic information on the dataset.
13 The sample 
accounts for around three quarters of bank lending to euro-area residents. The average size of 
banks in the sample is the largest in the Netherlands, Finland and Spain and smallest in Italy, 
Austria and Germany. Averages for individual bank characteristics remain heterogeneous 
across countries in terms of capital, loan loss provisions and liquidity characteristics partly 
reflecting  different  stages  of  the  business  cycle  as  well  as  different  competitive  and 
institutional conditions. 
                                                            
11 Data for 1998 has also been included to calculate growth rates. 
12 See Jeffrey (2006) for an overview of the accounting consequences of securitization. 
13 Only euro-area banks that have at least four years of consecutive data are included in the sample. Banks 
which do not report positive figures for total assets, total loans and total capital for any given year are excluded. 




In order to proxy for banks’ risk we have also inserted two control variables. The first 
variable  represents  loan  loss  provisions  as  a  percentage  of  loans.  This  variable  is  quite 
standard in the literature and represents an ex-post accounting measure of credit risk. The 
second is given by the one-year expected default frequency (EDF) which is a widely-used 
measure of credit risk by financial institutions, including central banks and regulators (see, 
for instance, ECB, 2006, and IMF, 2006).
14 EDF is a forward-looking indicator of credit risk 
computed by Moody’s KMV using financial markets data, balance sheet information and 
Moody’s proprietary bankruptcy database.
15 This measure is very important because it allows 
us to capture transfer of credit risk to the markets not only via true sale securitisation but also 
by means of credit derivatives or synthetic CDOs. EDF information is not available for all 
banks.  From  1999  to  2005,  the  sum  of  total  assets  of  banks  for  which  Moody’s  KMV 
constructs EDF figures accounts for around 52% of the total assets of banks in our sample. 
For banks that do not have EDF we have approximated their default probability by means of 
a cluster analysis. 
Securitisation  data  are  obtained  from  Bondware  which  is  a  database  compiled  by 
Dealogic, an independent data distributor and completed with data from Standard and Poor’s 
(S&P), a large private rating agency. Securitisation data start in 1999 and cover an extensive 
range of around 4,500 deals (Table 2). We look at individual deal-by-deal issuance patterns 
from  euro-area  originators.
16  The  advantage  of  using  data  on securitisation activity from 
Bondware and S&P is that the name of the originator, date of issuance and deal proceeds are 
registered.
17 We cover all ABS securities as well as cash flow (balance-sheet) CDOs issued 
by euro-area originators that accomplish two main criteria. First, that the bank originating the 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
are excluded. Anomalies in loan growth rates are controlled for by checking for possible merger and acquisition 
activity related to full mergers from 1998 to 2005 in the Thomson SDC Platinum database. 
14 Furfine (2006) uses EDF to assess the effect of mergers on banks’ risk in American banks. 
15 The calculation of EDF builds on Vasicek and Kealhofer’s extension of the Black-Scholes-Merton option-
pricing framework to make it suitable for practical analysis as well as on the proprietary default database owned 
by KMV (see Kealhofer, 2003, Crosbie and Bohn, 2003 and Garlappi, Shu and Yan, 2007 for further details on 
the construction of EDFs and an example of a recent application). 
16 It includes twelve euro-area countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
17 We compare Bondware’s and S&P’s coverage of securitization activity data with individual deal by deal data 
on securitization activity provided by Moody’s, Eurostat and the European Securitisation Forum to obtain a 
comprehensive view of the size of the securitization market.  
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loan passes them from their balance-sheet to the markets via asset-backed securities and, 
second, that it receives funding from investors from the sale of those securities.  
Data on individual securitisation deals have been matched with financial statements of 
each bank originating the deal. Banks active on the securitisation market are characterized on 
average by their large scale (EUR 73 billion of total assets), a lower level of the capital-to-
asset ratio (6.4%) than other banks, as well as a lower liquidity ratio (15.2%). These bank 
characteristics  are  consistent  with  the  idea  that  there  are  some  economies  of  scale  in 
securitisation  activity.  Moreover,  banks  active  in  the  securitisation  market  (SEC  banks) 
maintain a lower level of liquidity or capital, because the selling of bank loans on the market 
allows  them  to  be  less  constrained  by  liquidity  management  and  minimum  capital 
requirements. The growth rate of lending of SEC banks is more than triple that of the average 
bank in the sample (16% compared with 5% respectively).  
5. Results 
The results of the study are summarized in Table 3. The models have been estimated 
using the GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) which ensures efficiency 
and consistency provided that the models are not subject to serial correlation of order two 
and the instruments used are valid (which is tested for with the Sargan test). 
The  first  column  presents  the  results  for  our  benchmark  equation  (1).  Changes  in 
economic  activity  have  a  positive  and  significant  effect  on  lending:  better  economic 
conditions increase the number of projects that become profitable in terms of expected net 
present value and hence increase the demand for bank credit from borrowers (Kashyap, Stein 
and Wilcox, 1993). A 1% increase in GDPN (which produces a bank loan demand shift) 
causes  a  loan  increase  of  around  0.5%.  In  contrast  the  response  of  bank  lending  to  a 
monetary policy shock has the expected negative sign, suggesting a reduction in loan growth 
as a result of increases in the monetary policy rates (see coefficients for DiM t and D iM t-1).  
Securitisation  activity  is  positively  related  to  bank  lending.  That  is,  banks  that 
securitize their assets to a larger extent have, on average, a higher growth rate of lending.  
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This  result  is  consistent  with  the  view of securitisation as a source of capital relief and 
additional funding that can be used by banks to grant additional loans.  
The effect of liquidity and capital on lending (LIQ and CAP) indicates that liquid and 
well-capitalised  banks  have  more  opportunities  to  expand  their  loan  portfolio.  On  the 
contrary, consistent with Ehrmann et al. (2003), the effect for size is negative, and the role of 
size as an indicator of informational asymmetries appears to be quite poor. Several features 
of banking markets in the euro area (low number of banking failures, decreasing role of the 
government, presence of comprehensive deposit insurance schemes, network arrangements 
in  groups,  strong  relationship  lending  between  small  banks  and  small  firms)  seem  to 
diminish the usefulness of size as an indicator of (lower) informational friction. 
The riskiness of the credit portfolio has a negative effect on banks’ capacity to increase 
lending. Other things being equal, higher loan loss provisions (LLP) reduce profits, bank 
market capital and, therefore, have negative consequences on supplied lending. A similar 
effect is detected for the expected default frequency (EDF).
18 The mechanism suggests that 
banks’ risk conditions matter for the supply of loans and it probably works by means of 
“market  discipline”  including   the  capacity  of  banks  to issue riskier uninsured debt (i.e. 
bonds or CDs) which might be easier for less risky banks because they have more capacity to 
absorb future losses.
19  
As expected, the interaction terms between size, liquidity, capitalisation and monetary 
policy have the positive sign. In line with the bank lending channel literature, big, liquid and 
well-capitalized banks are better able to buffer their lending activity against shocks affecting 
the  availability  of external finance. It is worth noting that the coefficient of LIQ*DiM is 
however  only  marginally  different  from  zero.  From  a  monetary  policy  perspective,  the 
implication of this result is that the liquidity indicator reduces its significance if considered 
jointly with the ability of banks to sell loans on to the market. In other words, a bank may be 
less  liquid  than  others  but  more  insulated  than  more  liquid  banks  because of its greater  
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capacity to securitize loans. Bank liquidity in itself, is not sufficiently informative, meaning 
that this indicator has to be considered together with the full range of securitisation issues.  
The  effects  on  lending  of  a  1%  increase  in  the  short-term  monetary  rate  are 
summarised  in  Figure  9  that  shows  the  effects  for  banks  that  make  a  different  use  of 
securitization  techniques.  In  particular  it  compares  the  effect  on  the  average  bank  (that 
securitises only 2% of its assets, SEC=0.02) with banks that use securitization in a more 
prominent way: the median SEC bank that securitises 10% of total assets, and the average 
SEC  bank  that  sells  one  quarter  of  its  assets.  The  aim  is  to  verify  not  only  whether 
securitisation generates some insulation effects on banks’ loan supply but also to have an 
assessment of the magnitude in relation to securitisation activity. For each bank we consider 
the immediate pass-through (over the first year) and the long-term effects.  
Results indicate that a 1% increase in the monetary policy indicator leads to a decline 
in lending for the average bank of 0.6% in the short term and of 0.7% in the long run. SEC 
banks  are  on  average  more  insulated  from  the  effects  of  a  monetary  policy  shock.  The 
insulation, however, is not complete for the median SEC bank, for which the long-term effect 
of monetary policy on supplied lending remains significant. The supply of loans becomes 
insulated  from  monetary  policy  changes  only  when  a  bank  is  particularly  active  on  the 
securitisation market, with a volume of ABS that accounts for at least a quarter of its assets 
(this corresponds to the average value of SEC banks in our sample): in this case the long-
term effect is equal to 0.3% with an associated standard error of 0.2.
20  
Since the results presented so far are based on panel data regressions, the long-term 
coefficient on the monetary policy indicator represents the reaction of the average bank in the 
sample or specific categories of SEC banks. Given the heterogeneity of reaction across banks 
(as shown by the significant interaction terms in Table 3), the response of the average bank 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
18  The  model  includes  both  a  backward (LLP) and a forward-looking (EDF) proxy for credit risk. Strong 
collinearity among the variables was not detected. Results remain the same when only a single proxy for credit 
risk is included. 
19 Empirical evidence shows that lower capital levels are associated with higher prices for uninsured liabilities. 
See, for example, Ellis and Flannery (1992) and Flannery and Sorescu (1996). 
20 Standard errors for the long-run effect have been approximated with the “delta method” which expands a 
function of a random variable with a one-step Taylor expansion (Rao, 1973).  
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may  be  not  informative  as  to  the  overall  macroeconomic  effect  of  monetary  policy  on 
supplied lending. In order to obtain some macroeconomic insights from these results it is 
important to weight the banks in the sample according to their respective market share when 
calculating  their  response  to  monetary  policy. The resulting overall response of the loan 
market can, in principle, be quite different from the response of the average bank, depending 
on  the  distribution  of  the  specific  characteristics  (size,  liquidity,  capitalisation  and 
securitisation) and market shares across banks. Using the coefficients in the baseline model 
and weighting bank-specific characteristics, we found that the overall market response to a 
1% increase in the monetary market rate in the long term is equal to -0.7. This is lower than 
the effect detected in the literature for the period before the introduction of the euro. For 
example,  the  same  macroeconomic  relevance  exercise  performed  using  the  model  in 
Ehrmann et al. (2003), which has a very similar set up but is estimated for the period 1992-
1999, gives a long-term coefficient of -1.3. Overall, these results call for two observations. 
First, the effectiveness of the bank lending channel has decreased since the introduction of 
the euro; second, the effects of securitisation are far from completely insulating the supply of 
bank loans from monetary policy changes. 
6. Robustness checks 
The robustness of the results has been checked in several ways. First, a test was run to 
introduce an additional interaction term by combining the securitisation measure with the 
growth rate in nominal GDP, giving the basic equation (1):  
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The reason for this test is the possible presence of endogeneity between the business 
cycle and securitisation. For example, Stanton (1998) show that securitisation of lending 
increases in periods of cyclical downturns or individual firm weakness. On the contrary,  
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Estrella (2002) finds that securitisation of multi-family home mortgages as a proportion of 
outstanding mortgages tends to decline during recessions. The test, reported in column II of 
Table 3, indicates that the interaction term v is positive and statistically significant while 
other coefficients remain broadly unchanged. Hence the positive effects of securitization on 
bank loan supply is dependent on the level of economic activity. In other words, banks that 
are more active in securitising their assets also experience a significant increase in bank 
lending but this effect diminishes in period of cyclical downturns.  
On the base of these results, if an increase of 1% in the short-term interest rate is 
associated  with  a  reduction  in  the  nominal  growth  rate  of  GDP  of  0.5%  we  can  easily 
observe that the insulation effect of securitization activity on lending vanishes and banks 
have the same drop in lending independently of their activism on the securitization market. 
Another robustness check, reported in the third column of Table 3, compares equation 
(1) with the following model: 
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All variables are defined as before, and  q t describes a complete set of time dummies. 
This model completely eliminates time variation and tests whether the macro variables used 
in the baseline equation (nominal income and the monetary policy indicator) capture all the 
relevant time effects. Again, the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms do not vary 
very much between the two kinds of model, which testifies to the reliability of the cross-
sectional evidence obtained. 
Finally, we also introduced a geographical control dummy for each model and assigned 
the value of one if the head office of the bank is in a given country and zero if elsewhere. In 
this way we test for the presence, if any, of country-specific institutional factors that could 
alter  the  results.  Also  in  this  case,  the  interactions  between  monetary  policy  and  bank-




European banks rarely used securitisation techniques before the introduction of the 
euro. In the last decade, however, there has been a spectacular increase in securitisation 
activity in the euro area. This is partly a global trend but it is also linked to other factors such 
as the increase in financial integration and moves towards a more market-based financial 
system. Therefore the European case provides an interesting framework to check whether or 
not securitisation activity has a significant effect on the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy.  To  do  so,  we  build  on  existing  transmission  mechanism  literature  and  use  an 
extensive database of banks’ financial statements and securitisation activity. 
We  find  that  the  changing  role  of  banks  from  “originate  and  hold”  to  “originate, 
repackage  and  sell”  reduces  the  effectiveness  of  the  bank  lending  channel  of  monetary 
policy. Thus, banks making more use of securitisation activity are also more sheltered from 
the  effects  of  monetary  policy  changes.  Moreover,  banks  making  a  massive  use  of 
securitisation, grant more loans and this effect is stronger when the economy is in good 
shape.  
Our  results  complement  the  conclusions  of  earlier  studies,  which  suggest  that 
belonging to a larger conglomerate or bank dimension have a dampening effect on monetary 
policy  (Campello,  2002;  Gambacorta,  2005;  Ashcraft,  2006).  Taken  together  the  results 
suggest that, nowadays, the role of the bank lending channel has decreased compared with 
the past when banks were smaller, less integrated in groups and less able to liquidate loans 
into secondary markets. At the same time, our macro-relevance exercise highlights that the 
effects of securitisation are far from a complete insulation of loan supply from monetary 
policy changes. Significantly, banks’ risk profile has a significant impact on loan supply, 
highlighting the importance of financial stability from a monetary policy perspective. 
Two issues merit further research. First, this analysis is limited to studying the effects 
of securitisation on bank loan supply, without considering the possible impact on other forms 
of credit supplied to the economy: the positive effect of securitisation on bank lending may 
limit  borrowers’  demand  for  other  forms  of  credit.  For  instance,  with  the  advent  of 
securitisation  borrowers  might  find  financing  from  banks  at  more  favourable  terms  than 
raising direct funding through the corporate bond market. Likewise, it is also worth exploring  
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how monetary policy conduct could or should be suitably adjusted to account for the greater 
liquidity resulting from asset securitisation. For example, securitisation entails a stronger role 
for  institutional  investors  as  ultimate  buyers  of  credit.  As  a  result  the  aggregate  lending 
supply is now strongly influenced by financial intermediaries that do not collect deposits and 
which are significantly less affected by changes in the money supply. At the same time the 
effect of the growing influence of institutional investors on credit markets and the more 
prevalent role of banks as credit originators on the transmission mechanism is far from being 




Tables and figures  
Table 1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY COUNTRY  
(1) 
(percentages, millions of euros, expected default frequencies and number of banks)   
  Lending 
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  3.2  23.7  0.72  0.4





  1.4  10.8  0.02  0.1





  0.2  11.6  0.01  0.2





  1.5  13.9  1.80  0.7





  1.0  24.8  1.66  1.0





  1.2  13.5  0.24  1.4





  1.4  17.0  0.70  0.3





  1.0  31.1  1.22  0.3





  4.5  45.2  5.69  1.2





  2.7  24.1  19.36  0.8
  31 
Portugal  11.9  7,362  12.9  1.9  6.5  10.18  0.2  22 
Spain  8.1  15,615  9.9  1.4  7.5  1.51  0.1  41 
Euro area   5.0  5,400  7.9  1.3  24.9  1.93  0.5  2,948 
Sources: Bankscope, Eurostat, KMV-Moody’s.  
Note: (1) Expected default frequency (EDF) figures are available for 134 banks representing 52% of the total sample total assets. 
 
 
 Table 2 
STATISTICS ON SECURITISATION DEALS 1999-2005  
(millions of euros and number of observations) 
Country Mean Median St Dev 1st Quart. 3rd  Quart. Total Obs.
Austria 145 24 410 12 100 6,086 42
Belgium 158 53 350 20 139 18,958 120
Finland 141 83 154 16 240 2,969 21
France 168 49 310 16 150 75,121 446
Germany 137 35 367 15 76 132,415 966
Greece 327 83 404 28 593 13,395 41
Ireland 199 40 359 16 255 27,451 138
Italy 237 56 397 18 294 211,964 896
Luxembourg 295 46 540 13 353 2,948 10
Netherlands 243 32 562 14 200 153,509 632
Portugal 195 27 444 12 145 45,318 232
Spain 293 52 481 18 326 271,156 925
Euro Area 215 40 433 16 200 961,289 4,469 




Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error
DLt-1 -0.151 *** 0.002 -0.147 *** 0.001 -0.020 *** 0.002 -0.090 *** 0.003
DGDPNt-1 0.461 *** 0.093 0.589 *** 0.100
SECt-1 0.048 *** 0.000 0.037 *** 0.001 0.036 *** 0.000 0.033 *** 0.000
SIZEt-1 -0.009 *** 0.001 -0.010 *** 0.001 -0.006 *** 0.001 -0.006 *** 0.001
LIQt-1 0.191 *** 0.007 0.187 *** 0.005 0.133 *** 0.005 0.368 *** 0.013
CAPt-1 0.005 *** 0.000 0.005 *** 0.000 0.004 *** 0.000 0.020 *** 0.000
EDFt-1 -0.049 *** 0.001 -0.054 *** 0.001 -0.055 *** 0.001 -0.103 *** 0.004
LLPt-1 -0.112 *** 0.002 -0.129 *** 0.002 -0.072 *** 0.001 -0.100 *** 0.001
D i M t -0.622 *** 0.120 -0.680 *** 0.122
D i M t-1 -0.199 ** 0.089 -0.281 *** 0.099
D i M t*SECt-1 1.922 *** 0.010 1.233 *** 0.032 1.175 *** 0.006 1.465 *** 0.010
D i M t*SIZEt-1 0.544 *** 0.063 0.498 *** 0.060 0.633 *** 0.060 0.590 *** 0.060
D i M t*LIQt-1 1.078 * 0.586 0.845 0.555 0.737 0.470 0.663 1.032
D i M t*CAPt-1 0.153 *** 0.008 0.143 *** 0.007 0.136 *** 0.001 0.090 ** 0.036
DGDPt*SECt-1 2.490 *** 0.021
Constant 0.059 *** 0.002 0.058 *** 0.002 0.057 *** 0.002
Time dummies  NO NO YES YES
Country dummies NO NO NO YES
Sample period
No. of banks, no. of 
observations 3,312 15,403 3,312 15,403 3,312 15,403 3,312 15,403
Sargan test (2nd step; pvalue) 0.312 0.126 0.110 0.152
MA(1), MA(2) (p-value) 0.000 0.103 0.000 0.140 0.000 0.201 0.000 0.062
The model is given by the following equation, which includes interaction terms that are the product of the monetary policy indicator and a bank specific characteristic:
with i=1,…, N  and  t=1, …, T and where: N = number of banks; Lit= loans in the balance sheet of bank i in quarter t; i Mt = monetary policy indicator; GDPNit = 
nominal GDP; SECit = securitization ratio; SIZEit=log of total assets; LIQit=liquidity ratio; CAPit=capital to asset ratio; LLPit=loan loss provision over total assets; 
EDFit =Expected default frequency. One lag has been introduced in order to obtain white noise residuals. The models have been estimated using the GMM estimator 
suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). In the GMM estimation, instruments are the second and further lags of the growth rate of the dependent variable and of the 
bank-specific characteristics included in each equation. Inflation, GDP growth rate and the monetary policy indicator are considered as exogenous variables. The 
interactions terms and control variables that turned out not to be statistically significant in all the models have been removed from the table. The symbols *, **, and 
*** represent significance levels of 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent respectively.
1998-2005 1998-2005 1998-2005 1998-2005
(III)                                (IV)                          
Dependent variable: annual 
growth rate of lending (DLt)
Time dummies
Time and geographical control 
dummies
Baseline Model 
Securitisation and the business 
cycle
(I)                      (II)                         
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TOTAL EURO-DENOMINATED ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES ISSUANCE 
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Source: European Commission. 




SECURITISATION BY COUNTRY OF ISSUANCE IN 2005  
















Sources: European Securitisation Forum, Thomson Financial, Dealogic, JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Structured Finance 
International, Bloomberg.  Figure 3 
SECURITISATION BY COUNTRY OF COLLATERAL 
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Sources: Eurostat, European Securitisation Forum,  Thomson Financial, Dealogic, JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Structured 
Finance International, Bloomberg. 
 
Figure  4 
SECURITISATION BY TYPE OF INSTRUMENT IN 2005 












Sources: European Securitisation Forum,  Thomson Financial, Dealogic, JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Structured Finance 
International, Bloomberg.  
Figure 6 
CHANGES IN CREDIT STANDARDS ON LOANS TO CORPORATIONS 
































































Short-term  Long-term All loans
 
Source: European Central Bank. 
Note: The net percentage refers to the difference between the sum of the percentages for “tightened considerably” and 
“tightened somewhat” and the sum of the percentages for “eased considerably” and “eased somewhat”. See 
http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/lend/html/index.en.html for further information. 
 
Figure 5 
EUROPEAN ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES INVESTOR LOCATION 














Source: The Bond Market Association Primary Distribution Survey. Figure 7 
DISTANCE TO DEFAULT 
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Source: Moody’s KMV. 
 
Figure 8 
TOTAL BANK LENDING IN THE EURO AREA 
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Sources: Thomson Financial, Dealogic, JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Structured Finance International, Bloomberg.  




EFFECT OF A ONE PER CENT INCREASE OF THE MONETARY 
























Note: We evaluate the effect of a one per cent increase of the short-term interest rate on bank lending considering banks 
with a different activism in the securitization market. SEC is the ratio of annual securitized lending and the total assets at 
the beginning of the year. The coefficients are calculated on the base of the benchmark model in Table 3. The symbols *, 
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